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Cases citing this case: Supreme Court
Cases citing this case: Circuit Courts
U.S. Supreme Court
IN RE DEBS, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)
158 U.S. 564
In re DEBS et al.
No. 11.
May 27, 1895.
[158 U.S. 564, 565] On July 2, 1894, the
United States, by Thomas E. Milchrist, district attorney for the
Northern district of Illinois, under the direction of Richard Olney,
attorney general, filed their
[158 U.S. 564, 566] bill of complaint in
the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of
Illinois against these petitioners and others. This bill set forth,
among other things, the following facts: It named 22 railroad
companies, and it alleged that they were engaged in the business of
interstate commerce, and subjet to the provisions of the act of
congress of February 4, 1887, known as the 'Interstate Commerce Act,'
and all other laws of the United States relating to interstate
transportation of passengers and freight; that the number of
passengers annually carried by them into the city of Chicago from
other states than Illinois, and out of Chicago into other states than
Illinois, was more than 12,000,000, and in like manner that the
freight so carried into and out of the city of Chicago, from and into
other states than Illinois, amounted to many millions of tons; that
each of the roads was under contract to carry, and in fact carrying,
the mails of the United States; that all were by statute declared post
roads of the government; that many were by special acts of congress
required, at any and all times, to carry the troops and military
forces of the United States, and provisions, munitions, and general
supplies therefor; and that two of them were in the hands of receivers
appointed by the courts of the United States. It stated at some length
the necessity of the continued and uninterrupted running of such
interstate railroads for the bringing into the city of Chicago
supplies for its citizens and for the carrying on of the varied
industries of that city.
The bill further averred that four of the defendants,
naming them, were officers of an association known as the 'American
Railway Union'; that in the month of May, 1894, there arose a
difference or dispute between the Pullman Palace Car Company and its
employees, as the result of which a considerable portion of the latter
left the service of the car company; that thereafter the four officers
of the railway union combined together, and with others, to compel an
adjustment of such dispute, by creating a boycott against the cars of
the car company; that, to make such boycott effective, the railroads
running out of Chicago from operating qthe railroads running out of
Chicago from operating their trains, and were combining to extend
[158 U.S. 564, 567]
such boycott against Pullman sleeping cars by causing strikes
among employees of all railroads attempting to haul the same. It
charged knowledge on the part of the defendants of the necessity of
the use of sleeping cars in the operation of the business of the
railroads as common carriers, of the contracts for such use between
the railroad companies and the car company, of the contracts, laws,
and regulations binding the railway companies and the receivers to the
carrying of the mails; also of the fact that sleeping cars were, and
of necessity must be, carried upon the trains of said carriers with
cars containing the mails; that with this knowledge they entered into
a combination and conspiracy to prevent the railroad companies and the
receivers, and each of them, from performing their duties as common
carriers of interstate commerce, and in carrying into execution that
conspiracy did induce various employees of the railway companies to
leave the service of the companies, and prevent such companies and the
receivers from securing other persons to take their places; that they
issued orders, notifications, etc., to the members of the railway
union to leave the service of the companies and receivers, and to
prevent the companies and receivers from operating their trains; that
they had asserted that they could and would tie up, paralyze, and
break down any and every of said railway companies and receivers which
did not accede to their demands; that, in pursuance of the
instructions, commands, and requests of said officers, large numbers
of the employees of the railway companies and receivers left their
service.
Then followed these allegations:
'And your orator further charges that said
defendants aimed and intended, and do now aim and intend, in and by
the said conspiracy and combination, to secure unto themselves the
entire control of the interstate, industrial, and commercial
business in which the population of the city of Chicago and of the
other communities along the lines of road of said railways are
engaged with each othe, and to restrain any and all other persons
from any independent control or management of such interstate,
industrial, or commercial enterprises, save according to the will
and with the consent of the defendants.
[158 U.S. 564, 568]
'Your orator further avers that in pursuance of said
combination and conspiracy, and to accomplish the purpose thereof as
hereinbefore set forth, the said defendants Debs, Howard, Rogers,
Keliher, and others, officers of said American Railway Union, issued
or caused to be issued the orders and directions as above set forth,
and that in obedience of such orders, and in pursuance of said
conspiracy and combination, numerous employees of said railroad
companies and receivers unitedly refused to obey the orders of said
employers or to perform the usual duties of such service, and many
others of such employees quit such service with the common purpose
and with the result of preventing said railroad companies and
receivers from operating their said railroads and from transporting
the United States mails, and from carrying on or conducting their
duties as common carriers of interstate traffic.
'Your orator further avers that, pursuant to said
combination and conspiracy, and under the direction as aforesaid of
said officers and directors of said American Railway Union, said
other defendants, and other persons whose names are to your orator
unknown, proceeded, by collecting together in large numbers, by
threats, intimidation, force, and violence, at the station grounds,
yards, and right of way of said railroad companies, respectively, in
the state of Illinois, to prevent said railroad companies from
employing other persons to fill the vacancies aforesaid; to compel
others, still employees of said railroad companies, to quit such
employment, and to refuse to perform the duties of their service,
and to prevent the persons remaining in such service, and ready and
willing to perform the duties of the same, from doing so.
'Your orator further avers that said defendants, in
pursuance of said combination and conspiracy, acting under the
direction of said officers and directors of said American Railway
Union, did with force and violence, at divers times and places,
within said state of Illinois and elsewhere, stop, obstruct, and
derail and wreck the engines and trains of said railroad companies,
both passenger and freight, then and there engaged in interstate
commerce and in transporting United States mails, by locking the
switches of the railroad of said
[158 U.S. 564, 569] railroad companies,
by removing the spikes and rails from the track thereof, by turning
switches and displacing and destroying signals, by assaulting and
interfering with and disabling the switchmen and other employees of
said railroad companies having charge of the signals, switches, and
tracks of said companies, and the movement of trains thereon, and in
other manners, by force and violence, depriving the employees of
said railroad companies in charge of such trains of the control and
management of the same, and by these and other unlawful means
attempted to obtain and exercise absolute control and domination
over the entire operations of said railroads.'
The bill further set forth that there had become
established in the city of Chicago a business conducted under the name
of the Union Stock Yards, at which for many years immense numbers of
live stock from states and territories beyond the state of Illinois
had been received, slaughtered, and converted into food products, and
distributed to all quarters of the globe, and that all the large
centers of population in the United States were in a great degree
dependent upon those stock yards for their food supply of that
character; that for the purpose of handling such live stock and the
product thereof, the company conducting such business operated certain
railroad tracks, and that in pursuance of the combination and
conspiracy aforesaid the four defendants, officers of the railway
union, issued orders directing all the employees handling such
railroad tracks to abandon such service.
To this was added the following:
'And your orator further alleges that, in pursuance
of the like combination and unlawful conspiracy, the said
defendants, and others combining and conspiring with them, for the
purpose of still further restraining and preventing the conduct of
such business, have by menaces, threats, and intimidation prevented
the employment of other persons to take the place of the employees
quitting the service of said company so operating said Union Stock
Yards.
'And your orator further charges that by reason of
said unlawful combination and conspiracy and the acts and doings
aforesaid thereunder, the supply of coal and fuel for consump-
[158 U.S. 564, 570]
tion throughout the different states of the Union, and
of grain, breadstuffs, vegetables, fruits, meats, and other
necessaries of life, has been cut off, interrupted, and interfered
with, and the market therefor made largely unavailable, and dealers
in all of said various products and the consumers thereof have been
greatly injured, and trade and commerce therein among the states her
been restrained, obstructed, and largely destroyed.'
The bill alleged that the defendants threatened and
declared that they would continue to restrain, obstruct, and interfere
with interstate commerce, as above set forth, and that they 'will, if
necessary to carry out the said unlawful combination and conspiracy
above set forth, tie up and paralyze the operations of every railway
in the United States, and the business and industries dependent
thereon.' Following these allegations was a prayer for an injunction.
The bill was verified.
On presentation of it to the court an injunction was
ordered commanding the defendants 'and all persons combining and
conspiring with them, and all other persons whomsoever, absolutely to
desist and refrain from in any way or manner interfering with,
hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of the business of any of the
following named railroads [ specifically naming the various roads
named in the bill] as common carriers of passengers and freight
between or among any states of the United States, and from in any way
or manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any
mail trains, express trains, or other trains, whether freight or
passenger, engaged in interstate commerce, or carrying passengers or
freight between or among the states; and from in any manner
interfering with, hindering, or stopping any trains carrying the mail;
and from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or
stopping any engines, cars, or rolling stock of any of said companies
engaged in interstate commerce, or in connection with the carriage of
passengers or freight between or among the states; and from in any
manner interfering with, injuring, or destroying any of the property
of any of said railroads engaged in, or for the purpose of, or in
connection with interstate commerce, or the carriage of
[158 U.S. 564, 571]
the mails of the United States, or the transportation of
passengers or freight between or among the states; and from entering
upon the grounds or premises of any of said railroads for the purpose
of interfering with, hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of said
mail trains, passenger or freight trains engaged in interstate
commerce, or in the transportation of passengers or freight between or
among the states, or for the purpose of interfering with, injuring, or
destroying any of said property so engaged in or used in connection
with interstate commerce, or the transportation of passengers or
property between or among the states; and from injuring or destroying
any part of the tracks, roadbed, or road or permanent structures of
said railroads; and from injuring, destroying, or in any way
interfering with any of the signals or switches of any of said
railroads; and from displacing or extinguishing any of the signals of
any of said railroads; and from spiking, locking, or in any manner
fastening any of the switches of any of a id railroads; and from
uncoupling or in any way hampering or obstructing the control by any
of said railroads of any of the cars, engines, or parts of trains of
any of said railroads engaged in interstate commerce or in the
transportation of passengers or freight between or among the states,
or engaged in carrying any of the mails of the United States; and from
compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats,
intimidation, persuasion, force, or violence, any of the employees of
any of said railroads to refuse or fail to perform any of their duties
as employees of any of said railroads in connection with the
interstate business or commerce of such railroads or the carriage of
the United States mail by such railroads, or the transportation of
passengers or property between or among the states; and from
compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats,
intimidation, force, or violence any of the employees of any of said
railroads who are employed by such railroads, and engaged in its
service in the conduct of interstate business or in the operation of
any of its trains carrying the mail of the United States, or doing
interstate business, or the transportation of passengers and freight
between and among the states,
[158 U.S. 564, 572] to leave the service of
such railroad; and from preventing any person whatever, by threats,
intimidation, force, or violence from entering the service of any of
said railroads, and doing the work thereof, in the carrying of the
mails of the United States or the transportation of passengers and
freight between or among the states; and from doing any act whatever
in furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain either of
said railroad companies or receivers in the free and unhindered
control and handling of interstate commerce over the lines of said
railroads, and of transportation of persons and freight between and
among the states; and from ordering, directing, aiding, assisting, or
abetting in any manner whatever any person or persons to commit any or
either of the acts aforesaid.
'And it is further ordered that the aforesaid
injunction and writ of injunction shall be in force and binding upon
such of said defendants as are named in said bill from and after the
service upon them severally of said writ, by delivering to them
severally a copy of said writ, or by reading the same to them, and
the service upon them respectively of the writ of subpoena herein,
and shall be binding upon said defendants, whose names are alleged
to be unknown, from and after the service of such writ upon them
respectively, by the reading of the same to them, or by the
publication thereof by posting or printing, and, after service of
subpoena upon any of said defendants named herein, shall be binding
upon said defendants and upon all other persons whatsoever who are
not named herein from and after the time when they shall severally
have knowledge of the entry of such order and the existence of said
injunction.'
This injunction was served upon the defendants, at
least upon those who are here as petitioners. On July 17th the
district attorney filed in the office of the clerk of said court an
information for an attachment against the four defendants, officers of
the railway union, and on August 1st, a similar information against
the other petitioners. A hearing was had before the circuit court, and
on December 14th these petitioners were found guilty of contempt, and
sentenced to [158 U.S.
564, 573] imprisonment in the county jail for terms
varying from three to six months. 64 Fed. 724. Having been committed
to jail in pursuance of this order, they, on January 14, 1895, applied
to this court for a writ of error, and also one of habeas corpus. The
former was on January 17th denied, on the ground that the order of the
circuit court was not a final judgment or decree. The latter is now to
be considered.
[158
U.S. 564, 577] C. S. Darrow, S. S. Gregory, and Lyman
Trumbull, for petitioners.
Atty. Gen. Olney, Asst. Atty. Gen. Whitney, and Edwin
Walker,f or respondents.
Mr. Justice BREWER, after stating the facts in the
foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The case presented by the bill is this: The United
States, finding that the interstate transportation of persons and
property, as well as the carriage of the mails, is forcibly
obstructed, and that a combination and conspiracy exists to subject
the control of such transportation to the will of the conspirators,
applied to one of their courts, sitting as a court of equity, for an
injunction to restrain such obstruction and prevent carrying into
effect such conspiracy. Two questions of importance are presented:
First. Are the relations of the general government to interstate
commerce and the transportation of the mails such as authorized a
direct interference to prevent a forcible obstruction thereof? Second.
If authority exists, as authority in governmental affairs implies both
power and duty, has a court of equity jurisdiction to issue an
injunction in aid of the performance of such duty?
[158 U.S. 564, 578]
1. What are the relations of the general government to
interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails? They are
those of direct supervision, control, and management. While, under the
dual system which prevails with us, the powers of government are
distributed between the state and the nation, and while the latter is
properly styled a government of enumerated powers, yet within the
limits of such enumeration it has all the attributes of sovereignty,
and, in the exercise of those enumerated powers, acts directly upon
the citizen, and not through the intermediate agency of the state.
'The government of the Union, then, is, emphatically
and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it
emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.'
'No trace is to be found in the constitution of an
intention to create a dependence of the government of the Union on
those of the states, for the execution of the great powers assigned
to it. Its means are adequate to its ends, and on those means alone
was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To
impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot
control, which another government may furnish or withhold, would
render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain,
and create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint
its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of
the constitution.' Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. State of
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 424.
'Both the states and the United States existed
before the constitution. The people, through that instrument,
established a more perfect union by substituting a national
government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens,
instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers,
greatly restricted, only upon the states.' Chief Justice Chase in
Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76.
'We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that
the government of the United States may, by means of physical force,
exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of
American soil the powers and functions that belong to
[158 U.S. 564, 579]
it. This necessarily involves the power to command
obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that
extent.'
'This power to enforce its laws and to execute its
functions in all places does not derogate from the power of the
state to execute its laws at the same time and in the same places.
The one does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be
executed at the same time. In that case the words of the
constitution itself show which is to yield. 'This constitution, and
all laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, ... shall be the
supreme law of the land.' Mr. Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 , 395.
See, also, The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116,
136; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
2 64, 413; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 555; Tennessee v.
Davis,
100 U.S. 257 ; The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581 , 9 Sup. Ct. 623; In re Neagle,
135 U.S. 1 , 10 Sup. Ct. 658; Logan v. U. S.,
144 U.S. 263 , 12 Sup. Ct. 617; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S.,
149 U.S. 698 , 13 Sup. Ct. 1016; In re Quarles,
158 U.S. 532 , 15 Sup. Ct. 959.
Among the powers expressly given to the national
government are the control of interstate commerce and the creation and
management of a post- office system for the nation. Article 1, 8, of
the constitution provides that 'the congress shall have power: ...
Third, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes. ... Seventh, to establish post
offices and post roads.'
Congress has exercised the power granted in respect to
interstate commerce in a variety of legislative acts. Passing by all
that legislation in respect to commerce by water, and considering only
that which bears upon railroad interstate transportation (for this is
the specific matter involved in this case), these acts may be noticed:
First. That of June 15, 1866 (14 Stat. 66), carried into the Revised
Statutes as section 5258, which provides:
'Whereas the constitution of the United States
confers upon congress, in express terms, the power to regulate
commerce among the several states, to establish post roads, and to
raise and support armies: Therefore, be it enacted by the
[158 U.S. 564, 580]
senate and house of representatives of the United
States of America in congress assembled, that every railroad company
in the United States whose road is operated by steam, its successors
and assigns, be, and is hereby, authorized to carry upon and over
its road, boats, bridges, and ferries all passengers, troops,
government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from
any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor,
and to connect with roads of other states so as to form continuous
lines for the transportation of the same to the place of
destination.'
Second. That of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat. 584; Rev. St.
4386-4389), which regulates the transportation of live stock over
interstate railroads. Third. That of May 29, 1884 (chapter 60, 6, 23
Stat. 32), prohibiting interstate transportation by railroads of live
stock affected with any contagious or infectious disease. Fourth. That
of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. 379), with its amendments of March 2,
1889 (25 Stat. 855), and February 10, 1891 (26 Stat. 743), known as
the 'Interstate Commerce Act,' by which a commission was created with
large powers of regulation and control of interstate commerce by
railroads, and the sixteenth section of which act gives to the courts
of the United States power to enforce the orders of the commission.
Fifth. That of October 1, 1888 (25 Stat. 501), providing for
arbitration between railroad interstate companies and their employees.
And, sixth, the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 531), requiring the use
of automatic couplers on interstate trains, and empowering the
interstate commerce commission to enforce its provisions.
Under the power vested in congress to establish post
offices and post roads, congress has, by a mass of legislation,
established the great post- office system of the country, with all its
detail of organization, its machinery for the transaction of business,
defining what shall be carried and what not, and the prices of
carriage, and also prescribing penalties for all offenses against it.
Obviously, these powers given to the national
government over interstate commerce, and in respect to the
transportation [158 U.S.
564, 581] of the mails, were not dormant and unused.
Congress had taken hold of these two matters, and, by various and
specific acts, had assumed and exercised the powers given to it, and
was in the full discharge of its duty to regulate interstate commerce
and carry the mails. The validity of such exercise, and the
exclusiveness of its control, had been again and again presented to
this court for consd eration. It is curious to note the fact that, in
a large proportion of the cases in respect to interstate commerce
brought to this court, the question presented was of the validity of
state legislation in its bearings upon interstate commerce, and the
uniform course of decision has been to declare that it is not within
the competency of a state to legislate in such a manner as to obstruct
interstate commerce. If a state, with its recognized powers of
sovereignty, is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, can it be
that any mere voluntary association of individuals within the limits
of that state has a power which the state itself does not possess?
As, under the constitution, power over interstate
commerce and the transportation of the mails is vested in the national
government, and congress, by virtue of such grant, has assumed actual
and direct control, it follows that the national government may
prevent any unlawful and forcible interference therewith. But how
shall this be accomplished? Doubtless, it is within the competency of
congress to prescribe by legislation that any interferences with these
matters shall be offenses against the United States, and prosecuted
and punished by indictment in the proper courts. But is that the only
remedy? Have the vast interests of the nation in interstate commerce,
and in the transportation of the mails, no other protection than lies
in the possible punishment of those who interfere with it? To ask the
question is to answer it. By article 3, 2, cl. 3, of the federal
constitution, it is provided: 'The trial of all crimes except in cases
of impeachment shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the
state where the said crime shall have been committed.' If all the
inhabitants of a state, or even a great body of them, should combine
to obstruct interstate commerce or the transportation
[158 U.S. 564, 582]
of the mails, prosecutions for such offenses had in such a
community would be doomed in advance to failure. And if the certainty
of such failure was known, and the national government had no other
way to enforce the freedom of interstate commerce and the
transportation of the mails than by prosecution and punishment for
interference therewith, the whole interests of the nation in these
respects would be at the absolute mercy of a portion of the
inhabitants of that single state.
But there is no such impotency in the national
government. The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce
in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national
powers and the security of all rights intrusted by the constitution to
its care. The strong arm of the national government may be put forth
to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce
or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises, the army
of the nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the nation,
to compel obedience to its laws.
But, passing to the second question, is there no other
alternative than the use of force on the part of the executive
authorities whenever obstructions arise to the freedom of interstate
commerce or the transportation of the mails? Is the army the only
instrument by which rights of the public can be enforced, and the
peace of the nation preserved? Grant that any public nuisance may be
forcibly abated, either at the instance of the authorities, or by any
individual suffering private damage therefrom. The existence of this
right of forcible abatement is not inconsistent with, nor does it
destroy, the right of appeal, in an orderly way, to the courts for a
judicial determination, and an exercise of their powers, by writ of
injunction and otherwise, to accomcomplish the same result. In Borough
of Stamford v. Stamford Horse R. Co., 56 Conn. 381, 15 Atl. 749, an
injunction was asked by the borough to restrain the company from
laying down its track in a street of the borough. The right of the
borough to forcibly remove the track was insisted upon as a ground for
questioning the jurisdiction of a court of equity, but the court
sustained the injunction, adding: 'And none the less so because of its
right to remove [158
U.S. 564, 583] the track by force. As a rule, injunctions
are denied to those who have adequate remedy at law. Where the choice
is between the ordinary and the extraordinary processes of law, and
the former are sufficient, the rule will not permit the use of the
latter. In some cases of nuisance, and in some cases of trespass, the
law permits an individual to abate the one and prevent the other by
force, because such permission is necessary to the complete protection
of property and person. When the choice is between redress or
prevention of injury by force and by peaceful process, the law is well
pleased if the individual will consent to waive his right to the use
of force, and await its action. Therefore, as between force and the
extraordinary writ of injunction, the rule will permit the latter.'
So, in the case before us, the right to use force does
not exclude the right of appeal to the courts for a judicial
determination, and for the exercise of all their powers of prevention.
Indeed, it is more to the praise than to the blame of the government
that, instead of determining for itself questions of right and wrong
on the part of these petitioners and their associates, and enforcing
that determination by the club of the policeman and the bayonet of the
soldier, it submitted all those questions to the peaceful
determination of judicial tribunals, and invoked their consideration
and judgment as to the measure of its rights and powers, and the
correlative obligations of those against whom it made complaint. And
it is equally to the credit of the latter that the judgment of those
tribunals was by the great body of them respected, and the troubles
which threatened so much disaster terminated.
Neither can it be doubted that the government has such
an interest in the subject-matter as enables it to appear as party
plaintiff in this suit. It is said that equity only interferes for the
protection of property, and that the government has no property
interest. A sufficient reply is that the United States have a property
in the mails, the protection of which was one of the purposes of this
bill. Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. 151, arose upon a compact between the
United States and the state of Pennsylvania in respect to the
Cumberland road, which provided, among other things, 'that no toll
shall be [158 U.S. 564,
584] received or collected for the passage of any wagon
or carriage laden with the property of the United States'; the
question being whether a carriage employed in transporting the mails
of the United States was one 'laden with the property of the United
States,' and it was held that it was, the court, by Chief Justice
Taney, saying: 'The United States have unquestionably a property in
the mails. They are not mere common carriers, but a government,
performing a high official duty in holding and guarding its own
property as well as that of its citizens committed to its care; for a
very large portion of the letters and packages conveyed on this road,
especially during the session of congress, consists of communications
to or from the officers of the executive departments, or members of
the legislature, on public service, or in relation to matters of
public concern. ... We think that a carriage, whenever it is carrying
the mail, is laden with the property of the United States, within the
true meaning of the compact.'
We do not care to place our decision upon this
ground alone. Every government, intrusted by the very terms of its
being with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the
general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any proper
assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other,
and it is no sufficient answer to its appeal to one of those courts
that it has no pecuniary interest in the matter. The obligations which
it is under to promote the interest of all and to prevent the
wrongdoing of one, resulting in injury to the general welfare, is
often of itsl f sufficient to give it a standing in court. This
proposition in some of its relations has heretofore received the
sanction of this court. In U. S. v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,
125 U.S. 273 , 8 Sup. Ct. 850, was presented an application of the
United States to cancel and annul a patent for land on the ground that
it was obtained by fraud or mistake. The right of the United States to
maintain such a suit was affirmed, though it was held that if the
controversy was really one only between individuals in respect to
their claims to property the government ought not to be permitted to
interfere, the court saying: 'If it be a question of property, a case
must be made in which the court can afford a remedy in
[158 U.S. 564, 585]
regard to that property; if it be a question of fraud which
would render the instrument void, the fraud must operate to the
prejudice of the United States; and if it is apparent that the suit is
brought for the benefit of some third party, and that the United
States has no pecuniary interest in the remedy sought, and is under no
obligation to the party who will be benefited to sustain an action for
his use; in short, if there does not appear any obligation on the part
of the United States to the public or to any individual, or any
interest of its own,-it can no more sustain such an action than any
private person could under similar circumstances.'
This language was relied upon in the subsequent
case of U. S. v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
128 U.S. 315 , 9 Sup. Ct. 90, which was a suit brought by the
United States to set aside a patent for an invention on the ground
that it had been obtained by fraud or mistake, and it was claimed that
the United States, having no pecuniary interest in the subject-matter
of the suit, could not be heard to question the validity of the
patent. But this contention was overruled, the court saying, in
response to this argument, after quoting the foregoing language from
the San Jacinto Case: 'This language is construed by counsel for the
appellee in this case to limit the relief granted at the instance of
the United States to cases in which it has a direct pecuniary
interest. But it is not susceptible of such construction. It was
evidently in the mind of the court that the case before it was one
where the property right to the land in controversy was the matter of
importance, but it was careful to say that the cases in which the
instrumentality of the court cannot thus be used are those where the
United States has no pecuniary interest in the remedy sought, and is
also under no obligation to the party who will be benefited to sustain
an action for his due, and also where it does not appear that any
obligation existed on the part of the United States to the public or
to any individual. The essence of the right of the United States to
interfere in the present case is its obligation to protect the public
from the monopoly of the patent which was procured by fraud, and it
would be difficult to find language more aptly used to include this in
the class of cases which are not excluded
[158 U.S. 564, 586]
from the jurisdiction of the court by want of interest in the
government of the United States.'
It is obvious from these decisions that while it is
not the province of the government to interfere in any mere matter of
private controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers to
enforce the rights of one against another, yet, whenever the wrongs
complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in
respect of matters which by the constitution are intrusted to the care
of the nation, and concerning which the nation owes the duty to all
the citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere
fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy
is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from
taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional
duties.
The national government, given by the constitution
power to regulate interstate commerce, has by express statute assumed
jurisi ction over such commerce when carried upon railroads. It is
charged, therefore, with the duty of keeping those highways of
interstate commerce free from obstruction, for it has always been
recognized as one of the powers and duties of a government to remove
obstructions from the highways under its control.
As said in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713,
724:
'The power to regulate commerce comprehends the
control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the
navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a
state other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are
the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite
legislation by congress. This necessarily includes the power to keep
them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation
interposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such obstructions
when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they may deem
proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of
offenders. For these purposes, congress possesses all the powers
which existed in the states before the adoption of the national
constitution, and which have always existed in the parliament in
England.'
See, also, the following authorities, in which at
the instance of [158
U.S. 564, 587] the state, or of some municipality thereof
within whose limits the obstructed highway existed, a like power was
asserted: Borough of Stamford v. Stamford Horse R. Co., 56 Conn. 381,
15 Atl. 749; People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396; State v. Dayton & S.
E. R. Co., 36 Ohio St. 434; Inhabitants of Springfield v. Connecticut
R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 63; Attorney General v. Woods, 108 Mass. 436;
Easton & A. R. Co. v. Inhabitants of Greenwich, 25 N. J. Eq. 565;
County of Stearns v. St. Cloud, M. & A. R. Co., 36 Minn. 425, 32 N. W.
91; Rio Grande R. Co. v. City of Brownsville, 45 Tex. 88; City of
Philadelphia v. Thirteenth & F. St. P. Ry. Co., 8 Phila. 648.
Indeed, the obstruction of a highway is a public
nuisance (4 Bl. Comm. 167), and a public nuisance has always been held
subject to abatement at the instance of the government (Attorney
General v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239, 244; Attorney General v.
Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361; Village of Pine City v.
Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 44 N. W. 197; State v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682, 11
S. W. 119).
It may not be amiss to notice a few of the leading
cases. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91,
was a bill filed by the plaintiff to restrain the construction of an
aqueduct across the Potomac river. While, under the facts of that
case, the relief prayed for was denied, yet the jurisdiction of the
court was sustained. After referring to the right to maintain an
action at law for damages, it was said:
'Besides this remedy at law, it is now settled
that a court of equity may take jurisdiction in cases of public
nuisance by an information filed by the attorney general. This
jurisdiction seems to have been acted on with great caution and
hesitancy. ... Yet the jurisdiction has been finally sustained, upon
the principle that equity can give more adequate and complete relief
than can be obtained at law. Whilst, therefore, it is admitted by
all that it is confessedly one of delicacy, and accordingly the
instances of its exercise are rare, yet it may be exercised in those
cases in which there is imminent danger of irreparable mischief
before the tardiness of the law could reach it.'
[158 U.S. 564, 588]
State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13
How. 518, was a bill filed by the State of Pennsylvania to enjoin
the erection of a bridge over the Ohio river within the limits of
the state of Virginia. As the alleged obstruction was not within the
state of Pennsylvania, its right to relief was only that of an
individual in case of a private nuisance, and it was said, on page
564:
'The injury makes the obstruction a private
nuisance to the injured party; and the doctrine of nuisance applies
to the case where the jurisdiction is madeo ut, the same as in a
public prosecution. If the obstruction be unlawful, and the injury
irreparable by a suit at common law, the injured party may claim the
extraordinary protection of a court of chancery.
'Such a proceeding is as common and as free from
difficulty as an ordinary injunction bill, against a proceeding at
law, or to stay waste or trespass. The powers of a court of chancery
are as well adapted and as effectual for relief in the case of a
private nuisance as in either of the cases named. And in regard to
the exercise of these powers it is of no importance whether the
eastern channel, over which the bridge is thrown, is wholly within
the limits of the state of Virginia. The Ohio being a navigable
stream, subject to the commercial power of congress, and over which
that power has been exerted, if the river be within the state of
Virginia, the commerce upon it, which extends to other states, is
not within its jurisdiction. Consequently, if the act of Virginia
authorized the structure of the bridge, so as to obstruct
navigation, it could afford no justification to the bridge company.'
Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina,
144 U.S. 550 , 12 Sup. Ct. 689, was a bill filed by the state in
one of its own courts to enjoin the digging, mining, and removing
phosphate rock and deposits in the bed of a navigable river within its
territories. The case was removed by the defendant to the federal
court, and in that court the relief prayed for was granted. The decree
of the circuit court was sustained by this court, and in the opinion
by Mr. Justice Harlan, the matter of equity jurisdiction is discussed
at some length, and several cases cited; among them Attorney General
v. Richards, 2 Anstr. 603; Attorney
[158 U.S. 564, 589] General v. Forbes, 2
Mylne & C. 123; Gibson v. Smith, 2 Atk. 182; Attorney General v.
Jamacia Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361. From Attorney General v.
Forbes was quoted this declaration of the lord chancellor: 'Many cases
might have been produced in which the court has interfered to prevent
nuisance to public rivers and to public harbors; and the court of
exchequer, as well as this court, acting as a court of equity, has a
well- established jurisdiction, upon a proceeding by way of
information, to prevent nuisances to public harbors and public roads;
and, in short, generally to prevent public nuisances.' And from
Attorney General v. Jamacia Pond Aqueduct Corp. these words of the
supreme court of the state of Massachusetts: 'There is another ground
upon which, in our opinion, this information can be maintained, though
perhaps it belongs to the same general head of equity jurisdiction of
restraining and preventing nuisances. The great ponds of the
commonwealth belong to the public, and, like the tide waters and
navigable streams, are under the control and care of the commonwealth.
The rights of fishing, boating, bathing, and other like rights which
pertain to the public are regarded as valuable rights, entitled to the
protection of the government. ... If a corporation or an individual is
found to be doing acts without right the necessary effect of which is
to destroy or impair these rights and privileges, it furnishes a
proper case for an information by the attorney general to restrain and
prevent the mischief.' An additional case, not noticed in that
opinion, may also be referred to (Attorney General v. Terry, 9 Ch.
App. 423), in which an injunction was granted against extending a
wharf a few feet out into the navigable part of a river; Mellish, L.
J., saying: 'If this is an indictable nuisance, there must be a remedy
in the court of chancery, and that remedy is by injunction;' and
James, L. J., adding: 'I entirely concur. Where a public body is
intrusted with the duty of being conservators of a river, it is their
duty to take proceedings for the protection of those who use the
river.'
It is said that the jurisdiction heretofore
exercised by the national government over highways has been in respect
to [158 U.S. 564, 590]
waterways,-the natural highways of the country,-and not
over artii cial highways, such as railroads; but the occasion for the
exercise by congress of its jurisdiction over the latter is of recent
date. Perhaps the first act in the course of such legislation is that
heretofore referred to, of June 15, 1866; but the basis upon which
rests its jurisdiction over artificial highways is the same as that
which supports it over the natural highways. Both spring from the
power to regulate commerce. The national government has no separate
dominion over a river within the limits of a state; its jurisdiction
there is like that over land within the same state. Its control over
the river is simply by virtue of the fact that it is one of the
highways of interstate and international commerce. The great case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, in which the control of congress over
inland waters was asserted, rested that control on the grant of the
power to regulate commerce. The argument of the chief justice was that
commerce includes navigation, 'and a power to regulate navigation is
as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word
'commerce." In order to fully regulate commerce with foreign nations,
it is essential that the power of congress does not stop at the
borders of the nation, and equally so as to commerce among the states:
'The power of congress, then, comprehends
navigation within the limits of every state in the Union, so far as
that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian
tribes.' It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New
York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now
under consideration applies.'
See, also, Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713,
725, in which it was said: 'Wherever 'commerce among the states' goes,
the power of the nation, as represented in this court, goes with it,
to protect and enforce its rights.'
Up to a recent date, commerce, both interstate and
international, was chiefly by water, and it is not strange that both
the legislation of congress and the cases in the courts have been
principally concerned therewith. The fact that in recent
[158 U.S. 564, 591]
years interstate commerce has come to be carried on mainly by
railroads and over artificial highways has in no manner narrowed the
scope of the constitutional provision, or abridged the power of
congress over such commerce. On the contrary, the same fullness of
control exists in the one case as in the other, and the same power to
remove obstructions from the one as from the other.
Constitutional provisions do not change, but their
operation extends to new matters, as the modes of business and the
habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation. The
law of the common carrier is the same to-day as when transportation on
land was by coach and wagon, and on water by canal boat and sailing
vessel; yet in its actual operation it touches and regulates
transportation by modes then unknown,-the railroad train and the
steamship. Just so is it with the grant to the national government of
power over interstate commerce. The constitution has not changed. The
power is the same. But it operates to-day upon modes of interstate
commerce unknown to the fathers, and it will operate with equal force
upon any new modes of such commerce which the future may develop.
It is said that seldom have the courts assumed
jurisdiction to restrain by injunction in suits brought by the
government, either state or national, obstructions to highways either
artificial or natural. This is undoubtedly true, but the reason is
that the necessity for such interference has only been occasional.
Ordinarily, the local authorities have taken full control over the
matter, and by indictment for misdemeanor, or in some kindred way,
have secured the removal of the obstruction and the cessation of the
nuisance. As said in Attorney General v. Brown, 24 N. J. Eq. 89, 91:
'The jurisdiction of courts of equity to redress the grievance of
public nuisances by injunction is undoube d and clearly established;
but it is well settled that, as a general rule, equity will not
interfere where the object sought can be as well attained in the
ordinary tribunals. Attorney
[158 U.S. 564, 592] General v. New Jersey
R. & T. Co., 3 N. J. Eq. 136; Water Com'rs of Jersey City v. City of
Hudson, 13 N. J. Eq. 426; Attorney General v. Heishon, 18 N. J. Eq.
410; Railroad Co. v. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. 532; High, Inj. 521. And,
because the remedy by indictment is so efficacious, courts of equity
entertain jurisdiction in such cases with great reluctance, whether
their intervention is invoked at the instance of the attorney general,
or of a private individual who suffers some injury therefrom distinct
from that of the public, and they will only do so where there appears
to be a necessity for their interference. Rowe v. Granite Bridge, 21
Pick. 347; Railroad Co. v. Prudden, supra. The jurisdiction of the
court of chancery with regard to public nuisances is founded on the
irreparable damage to individuals, or the great public injury which is
likely to ensue. 3 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1740.' Indeed, it may be
affirmed that in no wellconsidered case has the power of a court of
equity to interfere by injunction in cases of public nuisance been
denied, the only denial ever being that of a necessity for the
exercise of that jurisdiction under the circumstances of the
particular case. Story, Eq. Jur. 921, 923, 924; Pom. Eq. Jur. 1349;
High, Inj. 745, 1554; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pl. & Prac. (4th Ed.) p. 1636
That the bill filed in this case alleged special facts
calling for the exercise of all the powers of the court is not open to
question. The picture drawn in it of the vast interests involved, not
merely of the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois, but of all
the states, and the general confusion into which the interstate
commerce of the country was thrown; the forcible interference with
that commerce; the attempted exercise by individuals of powers
belonging only to government, and the threatened continuance of such
invasions of public right, presented a condition of affairs which
called for the fullest exercise of all the powers of the courts. If
ever there was a special exigency, one which demanded that the courts
should do all that courts can do, it was disclosed by this bill, and
we need not turn to the public history of the day, which only
reaffirms with clearest emphasis all its allegations.
The difference between a public nuisance and a private
nui- [158 U.S. 564, 593]
sance is that the one affects the people at large and the
other simply the individual. The quality of the wrongs is the same,
and the jurisdiction of the courts over them rests upon the same
principles and goes to the same extent. Of course, circumstances may
exist in one case, which do not in another, to induce the court to
interfere or to refuse to interfere by injunction; but the
jurisdiction-the power to interfere-exists in all cases of nuisance.
True, many more suits are brought by individuals than by the public to
enjoin nuisances, but there are two reasons for this: First, the
instances are more numerous of private than of public nuisances; and,
second, often that which is in fact a public nuisance is restrained at
the suit of a private individual, whose right to relief arises because
of a special injury resulting therefrom.
Again, it is objected that it is outside of the
jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin the commission of crimes.
This, as a general proposition, is unquestioned. A chancellor has no
criminal jurisdiction. Something more than the threatened commission
of an offense against the laws of the land is necessary to call into
exercise the injunctive powers of the court. There must be some
interferences, actual or threatened, with property or rights of a
pecuniary nature; but when such interferences appear the jurisdiction
of a court of equity arises, and is not destroyed by the fact that
they are accompanied by or are themselves violations of the criminal
law. Thus, in Cranford v. Tyrrel, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514, an
injunction to restrain the defendant from keeping a house of ill fame
was sustained; the court saying, on page 344, 128 N. Y., and page 514,
28 N. E.: 'That the perpetrator of the nuisance is amenable to the
provisions and penalties of the criminal law is not an answer to an
action against him by a private person to recover for injury
sustained, and for an injunction against the continued use of his
premises in such a manner.' And in Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N.
R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 126, 4 South. 106, is a similar declaration, in
these words: 'The mere fact that an act is criminal does not divest
the jurisdiction of equity to prevent it by injunction, if it be also
a violation of property rights, and the party aggrieved has no other
adequate remedy for the prevention of the irreparable
[158 U.S. 564, 594]
injury which will result from the failure or inability of a
court of law to redress such rights.'
The law is full of instances in which the same act may
give rise to a civil action and a criminal prosecution. An assault
with intent to kill may be punished criminally, under an indictment
therefor, or will support a civil action for damages; and the same is
true of all other offenses which cause injury to person or property.
In such cases the jurisdiction of the civil court is invoked, not to
enforce the criminal law and punish the wrongdoer, but to compensate
the injured party for the damages which he or his property has
suffered; and it is no defense to the civil action that the same act
by the defendant exposes him also to indictment and punishment in a
court of criminal jurisdiction. So here the acts of the defendants may
or may not have been violations of the criminal law. If they were,
that matter is for inquiry in other proceedings. The complaint made
against them in this is of disobedience to an order of a civil court,
made for the protection of property and the security of rights. If any
criminal prosecution be brought against them for the criminal offenses
alleged in the bill of complaint, of derailing and wrecking engines
and trains, assaulting and disabling employees of the railroad
companies, it will be no defense to such prosecution that they
disobeyed the orders of injunction served upon them, and have been
punished for such disobedience.
Nor is there in this any invasion of the
constitutional right of trial by jury. We fully agree with counsel
that 'it matters not what form the attempt to deny constitutional
right may take; it is vain and ineffectual, and must be so declared by
the courts.' And we reaffirm the declaration made for the court by Mr.
Justice Bradley in Boyd v. U. S.,
116 U.S. 616, 635 , 6 S. Sup. Ct. 524, that 'it is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be
obsta principiis.' But the power of a court to make an order carries
with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order,
and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been, from time
immemorial, the special function of the court. And
[158 U.S. 564, 595]
this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether
there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would
operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency. In the Case
of Yates, 4 Johns. 317, 369, Chancellor Kent, then chief justice of
the supreme court of the state of New York, said: 'In the Case of Earl
of Shaftsbury, 2 State Tr. 615, 1 Mod. 144, who was imprisoned by the
house of lords for 'high contempts committed against it,' and brought
into the king's bench, the court held that they had no authority to
judge of the contempt, and remanded the prisoner. The court in that
case seem to have laid down a principle from which they never have
departed, and which is essential to the due administration of justice.
This principle that every court, atl east of the superior kind, in
which great confidence is placed, must be the sole judge, in the last
resort, of contempts arising therein, is more explicitly defined and
more emphatically enforced in the two subsequent cases of The Queen v.
Paty [2 Ld. Raym 1105], and of The King v. Crosby [3 Wils. 188].' And
again, on page 371: 'Mr. Justice Blackstone pursued the same train of
observation, and declared that all courts, by which he meant to
include the two houses of parliament and the courts of Westminster
Hall, could have no control in matters of contempt; that the sole
adjudication of contempts, and the punishments thereof belonged
exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective court.' In
Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341, it was said: 'The power to fine
and imprison for contempt, from the earliest history of jurisprudence,
has been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of a court,
without which it could no more exist than without a judge. It is a
power inherent in all courts of record, and coexisting with them by
the wise provisions of the common law. A court without the power
effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the lawless, or
to enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against the recusant
parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a
stigma upon the age which invented it.' In Cart-
[158 U.S. 564, 596]
wright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238, we find this language:
'The summary power to commit and punish for contempts tending to
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is inherent in
courts of chancery and other superior courts, as essential to the
execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority,
and is part of the law of the land, within the meaning of Magna Charta
and of the twelfth article of our Declaration of Rights.' See, also,
U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Ex
parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505; Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 -672, 8 Sup. Ct. 273; Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. 289 , Sup. Ct. 77; Eilenbecker Terry,
128 U.S. 289 , 9 Sup. Ct. 77; Eilenbecker Sup. Ct. 424, in which
Mr. Justice Miller observed: 'If it has ever been understood that
proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court have
been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to
find any instance of it.' Commission v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447 -488, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125. In this last case it was
said: 'Surely it cannot be supposed that the question of contempt of
the authority of a court of the United States, committed by a
disobedience of its orders, is triable, of right, by a jury.'
In brief, a court enforcing obedience to its orders by
proceedings for contempt is not executing the criminal laws of the
land, but only securing to suitors the rights which it has adjudged
them entitled to.
Further, it is said by counsel in their brief:
'No case can be cited where such a bill in behalf of
the sovereign has been entertained against riot and mob violence,
though occurring on the highway. It is not such fitful and temporary
obstruction that constitutes a nuisance. The strong hand of
executive power is required to deal with such lawless
demonstrations.
'The courts should stand aloof from them and not
invade executive prerogative, nor, even at the behest or request of
the executive, travel out of the beaten path of well-settled
judicial authority. A mob cannot be suppressed by injunction; nor
can its leaders be tried, convicted, and sentenced in equity.
'It is too great a strain upon the judicial branch
of the [158 U.S. 564,
597] government to impose this essentially executive
and military power upon courts of chancery.'
We do not perceive that this argument questions the
jurisdiction of the court, but only the expediency of the action of
the government in applying for the process. It surely cannot be
seriously contended that the court has jurisdiction to enjoin the
obstruction of a highway by one person, but that its jurisdiction
ceases when the obstruction is by a hundred persos . It may be true,
as suggested, that in the excitement of passion a mob will pay little
heed to processes issued from the courts, and it may be, as said by
counsel in argument, that it would savor somewhat of the puerile and
ridiculous to have read a writ of injunction to Lee's army during the
late Civil War. It is doubtless true that inter arma leges silent, and
in the throes of rebellion or revolution the processes of civil courts
are of little avail, for the power of the courts rests on the general
support of the people, and their recognition of the fact that peaceful
remedies are the true resort for the correction of wrongs. But does
not counsel's argument imply too much? Is it to be assumed that these
defendants were conducting a rebellion or inaugurating a revolution,
and that they and their associates were thus placing themselves beyond
the reach of the civil process of the courts? We find in the opinion
of the circuit court a quotation from the testimony given by one of
the defendants before the United States strike commission, which is
sufficient answer to this suggestion:
'As soon as the employees found that we were
arrested, and taken from the scene of action, they became
demoralized, and that ended the strike. It was not the soldiers that
ended the strike. It was not the old brotherhoods that ended the
strike. It was simply the United States courts that ended the
strike. Our men were in a position that never would have been
shaken, under any circumstances, if we had been permitted to remain
upon the field, among them. Once we were taken from the scene of
action, and restrained from sending telegrams or issuing orders or
answering questions, then the minious of the corporations would be
put to work. [158 U.S.
564, 598] ... Our headquarters were temporarily
demoralized and abandoned, and we could not answer any messages. The
men went back to work, and the ranks were broken, and the strike was
broken up, ... not by the army, and not by any other power, but
simply and solely by the action of the United States courts in
restraining us from discharging our duties as officers and
representatives of our employees.'
Whatever any single individual may have thought or
planned, the great body of those who were engaged in these
transactions contemplated neither rebellion nor revolution, and when
in the due order of legal proceedings the question of right and wrong
was submitted to the courts, and by them decided, they unhesitatingly
yielded to their decisions. The outcome, by the very testimony of the
defendants, attests the wisdom of the course pursued by the
government, and that it was well not to oppose force simply by force,
but to invoke the jurisdiction and judgment of those tribunals to whom
by the constitution and in accordance with the settled conviction of
all citizens is committed the determination of questions of right and
wrong between individuals, masses, and states.
It must be borne in mind that this bill was not simply
to enjoin a mob and mob violence. It was not a bill to command a
keeping of the peace; much less was its purport to restrain the
defendants from abandoing whatever employment they were engaged in.
The right of any laborer, or any number of laborers, to quit work was
not challenged. The scope and purpose of the bill was only to restrain
forcible obstructions of the highways along which interstate commerce
travels and the mails are carried. And the facts set forth at length
are only those facts which tended to show that the defendants were
engaged in such obstructions.
A most earnest and eloquent appeal was made to us in
eulogy of the heroic spirit of those who threw up their employment,
and gave up their means of earning a livelihood, not in defense of
their own rights, but in sympathy for and to assist others whom they
believed to be wronged. We yield to none in our admiration of any act
of heroism or self-sacrifice, but we may be permitted to add that it
is a lesson [158 U.S.
564, 599] which cannot be learned too soon or too
thoroughly that une r this government of and by the people the means
of redress of all wrongs are through the courts and at the ballot box,
and that no wrong, real or fancied, carries with it legal warrant to
invite as a means of redress the co-operation of a mob, with its
accompanying acts of violence.
We have given to this case the most careful and
anxious attention, for we realize that it touches closely questions of
supreme importance to the people of this country. Summing up our
conclusions, we hold that the government of the United States is one
having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and
acting directly upon each citizen; that, while it is a government of
enumerated powers, it has within the limits of those powers all the
attributes of sovereignty; that to it is committed power over
interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail; that the powers
thus conferred upon the national government are not dormant, but have
been assumed and put into practical exercise by the legislation of
congress; that in the exercise of those powers it is competent for the
nation to remove all obstructions upon highways, natural or
artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying of
the mail; that, while it may be competent for the government (through
the executive branch and in the use of the entire executive power of
the nation) to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally
within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and
determination as to the existence and character of any alleged
obstructions, and if such are found to exist, or threaten to occur, to
invoke the powers of those courts to remove or restrain such
obstructions; that the jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such
matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient times and by
indubitable authority; that such jurisdiction is not ousted by the
fact that the obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in
themselves violations of the criminal law; that the proceeding by
injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by proceedings
in contempt; that such proceedings are not in execution of the
criminal laws of the land; that the penalty for a violation of
[158 U.S. 564, 600]
injunction is no substitute for and no defense to a
prosecution for any criminal offenses committed in the course of such
violation; that the complaint filed in this case clearly showed an
existing obstruction of artificial highways for the passage of
interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail,-an obstruction
not only temporarily existing, but threatening to continue; that under
such complaint the circuit court had power to issue its process of
injunction; that, it having been issued and served on these
defendants, the circuit court had authority to inquire whether its
orders had been disobeyed, and, when it found that they had been, then
to proceed under section 725, Rev. St., which grants power 'to punish,
by fine or imprisonment, ... disobedience, ... by any party ... or
other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command,' and enter the order of punishment complained of; and,
finally, that the circuit court having full jurisdiction in the
premises, its finding of the fact of disobedience is not open to
review on habeas corpus in this or any other court. Ex parte Watkins,
3 Pet. 193; Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 , 4 Sup. Ct. 152; Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. 280 - 305, 9 Sup. Ct. 77; In re Swan,
150 U.S. 637 , 14 Sup. Ct. 225; U. S. v. Pridgeon,
153 U.S. 48 , 14 Sup. Ct. 746.
We enter into no examination of the act of July 2,
1890 (26 Stat. 209 ), upon which the circuit court relied mainly to
sustain its jurisdiction. It must not be understood from this that we
dissent from the conclusions of that court in reference to the scope
of the act, but simply that we prefer to rest our judgment on the
broader ground which has been discussed in this opinion, believing it
of importance that the principles underlying it should be fully stated
and affirmed.
The petition for a writ of a beas corpus is denied.
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