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Cases citing this case: Supreme Court
Cases citing this case: Circuit Courts
U.S. Supreme Court
MCCRAY v. U S, 195 U.S. 27 (1904)
195 U.S. 27
LEO W. McCRAY, Plffs. in Err.,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 301.
Argued December 2, 1903.
Decided May 31, 1904.
[195 U.S. 27, 28]
The United States sued McCray for a statutory penalty of $50,
alleging that, being a licensed retail dealer in oleomargarine, he
had, in violation of the acts of Congress, knowingly purchased for
resale a fifty- pound package of oleomargarine, artificially colored
to look like butter, to which there was affixed internal revenue
stamps at the rate of 4/1 of a cent a pound, upon which the law
required stamps at the rate of 10 cents per pound. The answer of
McCray, whilst admitting the purchase of the package stamped as
alleged, set up two defenses.
First. It was averred that the oleomargarine in question was made
by a duly licensed manufacturer, the Ohio Butterine Company, from a
formula used by it in making a high grade oleomargarine composed of
'the following ingredients and none other, in these proportions; oleo
oil, 20 pounds; natural lard, 30 pounds; creamery butter, 50 pounds;
milk and cream, 30 pounds; common salt, 7 pounds.' It was asserted
that whilst it was true that the oleomargarine made from the
ingredients in question was of a yellow color, that this result was
not caused by artificial coloration, but was solely occasioned by the
fact that the butter, which was bought in open market, and used in
making the oleomargarine, had a deep yellow color imparted to it (the
butter) by a substance knows as Wells-Richardson's improved butter
color. This preparation, it was averred, was not injurious to health,
and was constantly used in the United States in the manufacture of
butter made from pure milk or cream, for the purpose of imparting to
it a deep yellow color. Averring that a yellow color produced in
oleomargarine by the employment of butter, as an ingredient, which was
artificially colored, did not amount to an artificial coloration of
the oleomargarine within the meaning of the statute, it was asserted
that the tax of 1/4 of a cent per pound was a compliance with the law.
[195 U.S. 27, 29]
Second. If the act of Congress impoing the tax, when rightly
construed, required stamps at the rate of 10 cents per pound upon
oleomargarine, colored as described in the first defense, the act
levying such tax was charged to be repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States. As a foundation for this defense the answer
contained the following averments:
Whilst butter made from pure milk and cream in the spring season
was of a deep yellow color, such butter when made at all other seasons
was of a pale yellow; that the taste of consumers of butter in the
United States required all butter to possess the deep color naturally
belongint to butter made in the spring season, and hence it had come
to pass that substantially all butter manufactured for sale in the
United States, not made in the spring season, and not naturally of a
deep yellow, was colored artificially so as to cause it to have the
deep yellow of spring butter. It was alleged that this deep yellow
coloration of natural butter was universally produced by the use of
either Wells-Richardson's compound or some other coloring ingredient,
which did not change the taste of the butter, none of which were
injurious to health. Oleomargarine, it was alleged, derived its chief
value as an article of food as a substitute for butter, and that
growing out of the taste of the consumers, unless the olemargarine
which was naturally white could be colored yellow, to present the
appearance of butter artificially colored, there was no demand for it,
and its manufacture and sale would be commercially impossible. It was
then averred that to impose upon the colored oleomargarine a tax of 10
cents per pound would burden it with such a charge as to render it
impossible to make and sell it in competition with butter, and
therefore the result of imposing a tax of 10 cents a pound on
oleomargarine when artificially colored would destroy the
oleomargarine industry. From these averments it was charged that if
the law imposed the tax of 10 cents upon the oleomargarine in
question, the statute was repug-
[195 U.S. 27, 30] nant to the Constitution,
because it deprived the defendant of his property without due process
of law; because the levy of such a burden was beyond the
constitutional power of Congress, since it was an unwarranted
interference by Congress 'with the police powers reserved to the
several states and to the people of the United States by the
Constitution of the United States;' and further, that said acts of
Congress were repugnant to the Constitution, since they finally lodged
in an executive officer the power to determine what constituted
artificial coloration of oleomargarine, and therefore invested such
officer with judicial authority; and, finally, because the attempt by
Congress to levy a tax at the rate of 10 cents a pound arbitrarily
discriminated against oleomargarine in favor of butter, to the extent
of destroying the oleomargarine industry for the benefit of the butter
industry, and was, therefore, violative of 'those fundamental
principles of equality and justice which are inherent in the
Constitution of the United States.'
The government demurred to the answer on the ground that it stated
no defense. The demurrer was sustained, and McCray electing to plead
no further, the court found the facts alleged in the petition to be
true, and adjudged that the government recover 'the sum of $50 as a
penalty and costs.' Because of the questions arising under the
Constitution, the case was then brought directly to this court.
Messrs. Miller Outcalt, Charles E. Prior, William D. Guthrie,
Francis J. Kearful, Delavan B. Cole, and Charles C. Carnahan for
plaintiff in error.
[195 U.S. 27, 37]
Solicitor General Hoyt for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice White:
[195 U.S. 27, 43]
Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered
the opinion of the court:
As the controversy in every aspect involves the acts of Congress
concerning the taxation of oleomargarine, a summary of those acts
becomes essential.
The original act was passed in 1886. (24 Stat. at L. 209, chap.
840, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2228.) The 1st section provided:
'That for the purposes of this act the word 'butter' shall be
understood to mean the food product usually known as butter, and
which is made exclusively from milk or cream, or both, with or
without common salt, and with or without additional coloring
matter.'
The 2d thus defined oleomargarine:
'That for the purposes of this act certain manufactured
substances, certain extracts, and certain mixtures and compounds,
including such mixtures and compounds with butter, shall be known
and designated as 'oleomargarine,' namely: All substances heretofore
known as oleomargarine, oleo, oleomargarine oil, butterine, lardine,
suine, and neutral; all mixtures and compounds of oleomargarine,
oleo, olemargarine oil, butterine, lardine, suine, and neutral; all
lard extracts and tallow extracts; and all mixtures and compounds of
tallow, beef fat, suet, lard, lard oil, vegetable oil, and annotto,
and other coloring matter; intestinal fat and offal fat made in
imitation of semblance of butter, or, when so made, calculated or
intended to be sold as butter or for butter.'
The 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th sections imposed
[195 U.S. 27, 44]
a license on manufacturers and dealers in oleomargarine, and
contained many requirements controlling the packing, marketing, and
supervision of the manufacture and sale of the taxed article. The 8th
section provided as follows:
'That upon oleomargarine which shall be manufactured and sold, or
removed for consumption or use, there shall be assessed and
collected a tax of two cents per pound, to be paid by the
manufacturer thereof; . . . The tax levied by this section shall be
represented by coupon stamps, and the provisions of existing laws
governing the engraving, issue, sale, accountability, effacement,
and destruction of stamps relating to tobacco and snuff, as far as
applicable, are hereby made to apply to stamps provided for by this
section.'
The other provisions of the statute, not necessary to be noticed,
contained many regulations looking to the enforcement and collection
of the licenses and taxes which the act imposed. In 1902 further
provisions were made on the subject, and the act of 1886 was, in many
respects, expressly amended. (32 Stat. at L. 193, chap. 784.) The
title of the act is--
'An Act to Make Oleomargarine and Other Imitation Dairy Products
Subject to the Laws of Any State er Territory or the District of
Columbia into Which They Are Transported, and to Change the Tax on
Oleomargarine, and to Impose a Tax, Provide for the Inspection, and
Regulate the Manufacture and Sale of Certain Dairy Products, and to
Amend an Act Entitled 'An Act Defining Butter, Also Imposing a Tax
Upon and Regulating the Manufacture, Sale, Importation, and
Exportation of Oleomargarine,' Approved August 2, 1886.'
The 1st section provides that all-- 'oleomargarine, butterine,
imitation, process, renovated, or adulterated butter, or imitation
cheese, or any substance in the semblance of butter or cheese, not the
usual product of the dairy, and not made exclusively of pure and
unadulterated milk or cream, transported into any state or territory
[195 U.S. 27, 45]
or the District of Columbia, and remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall, upon the arrival within
the limits of such state or territory or the District of Columbia, be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or
territory or the District of Columbia . . . to the same extent and in
the same manner as though such article or substances had been produced
in such state or territory or the District of Columbia, and shall not
be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise.'
Section 2 amends 3 of the act of 1886 in particulars not necessary
for the purposes of this case to be considered. Section 3 amends 8 of
the act of 1886 by increasing the tax on oleomargarine from two (2) to
ten ( 10) cents per pound, with this proviso: 'Provided, When
oleomargarine is free from artificial coloration that causes it to
look like butter of any shade of yellow, said tax shall be one-fourth
of one cent per pound. The tax levied by this section shall be
represented by coupon stamps; and the provisions of existing laws
governing the engraving, issue, sale, accountability, effacement, and
destruction of stamps relating to tobacco and snuff, as far as
applicable, are hereby made to apply to stamps provided for in this
section.'
Section 4 reiterates the definition of butter contained in the 1st
section of the act of 1886, and besides gives a definition of
'adulterated butter,' 'process butter,' or 'renovated butter,' and
imposes taxes upon the manufacture and sale of these articles, the tax
upon adulterated butter being at the rate of 10 cents a pound.
The section in question, as well as those following it, contains
many administrative provisions for the enforcement of the taxes levied
by the act, and concerning interstate and foreign commerce in the
articles referred to. Bearing, then, the statutes in mind, we come to
consider the assignments of error, which are as follows:
[195 U.S. 27, 46]
'The district court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the
United States to the answer of plaintiff in error (defendant below).
'The district court erred in refusing to hold that the act of
Congress approved August 2, 1886, as amended by the act of Congress
approved May 9, 1902, is in contravention of the Constitution of the
United States of America, and of the amendments thereto, and is
illegal and void, for the reasons:
'(b) The act is an unwarranted encroachment upon, and an
interference with, the police powers reserved to the several states
and to the people of the United States.
'(c) The act so arbitrarily discriminates against oleomargarine
in favor of butter as to destroy the oleomargarine industry for the
benefit of the butter industry of the United States, and is thus
repugnant to those fundamental principles which are inherent in the
Constitution of the United States.
'The district court erred in holding, if said act be not in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States, that
oleomargarine, which contains no artificial coloration than that
imparted to it by the use of butter which itself contains coloring
matter, and which therefore causes said oleomargarine to look like
butter of a shade of yellow, is subject to a tax of 10 cents per
pound instead of a tax of 1/4 of 1 cent per pound.'
It is to be observed that in the errors thus assigned no reference
is made to the contention in the answer that the acts of Congress were
void because conferring upon administrative officers the power to
finally decide what constituted artificial coloration; such
contention, therefore, may be put out of view. The errors relied upon
embrace not only the contention that the act of Congress imposing the
tax is repugnant to the Constitution, but also that the penalty was
wrongfully enforced, because the one-quarter of a cent per pound which
had been [195 U.S. 27,
47] paid on the oleomargarine was the only tax to which
it was liable under the act of Congress when rightly construed. As the
presence of the constitutional question imposes upon us the duty of
considering also the construction of the statute, we shall invert the
order in which the errors have been assigned, and come to consider,
first, whether the act of Congress, as properly construed, required on
the oleomargarine in question a tax of 10 cents a pound; and, second,
if it did, whether such act is repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States.
1st. The construction of the statute.
Leaving out of view the proviso to the 8th section of the act of
1886 as amended and re-enacted by the 3d section of the act of 1902,
it is beyond question that a tax of 10 cents a pound is imposed upon
oleomargarine. As the product was admitted by the answer to be
oleomargarine, it follows that it was subject to the tax of 10 cents a
pound, unless, by the proviso, the oleomargarine was of such a
character as to entitle it to the benefits of a lower rate of
taxation. Now the proviso reads: 'Provided, When oleomargarine is free
from artificial coloration that causes it to look like butter of any
shade of yellow, said tax shall be one-fourth of one cent per pound.'
As it was admitted that the oleomargarine was of a shade of yellow
causing it to look like butter, and as it was also admitted that this
shade of yellow had been imparted by an artificial coloring matter
used to color the butter which formed one of the ingredients from
which the oleomargarine was manufactured, it results, if the text of
the statute be applied, that the oleomargarine was not within the
proviso, because it was not free from artificial coloring matter
causing it to look like butter. This necessarily follows, since the
right to enjoy the lower rate of tax is made by the proviso to depend
upon whether, as a matter of fact, the oleomargarine was free from
artificial coloring matter, and not upon the mere method adopted for
imparting the artificial color. As the oleomargarine in question was
in fact not free from artificial col-
[195 U.S. 27, 48] oration, we think that a
construction which would take it out of the general rule imposing the
10 cent tax upon all oleomargarine, and bring it within the exception
embracing only oleomargarine free from artificial coloration, would be
not an interpretation of the statute, but a disregard of its
unambiguous provisions.
But it is contended that, as 2 of the act of 1886 defined
oleomargarine, for the purposes of that act, to be 'certain
manufactured substances, certain extracts, and certain mixtures and
compounds, including such mixtures and compounds with butter,' and as
not only the act of 1886, but the act of 1902, defined butter, for the
purposes of those acts, to mean 'the food product usually known as
butter, and which is made exclusively from milk or cream, or both,
with or without common salt, and with or without additional coloring
matter,' therefore colored oleomargarine produced by using, as one of
the ingredients of its manufacture, butter artificially colored, must
be treated as free from artificial coloration within the meaning of
the act of 1902, and the deduction made is that, as the statute treats
butter, both with or without artificial coloration, as a legitimate
ingredient of oleomargarine, the use of an authorized ingredient did
not cause the manufactured product to be other than oleomargarine
within the statute. But the proposition goes further, and asserts that
because butter, whether artificially colored or not, was an authorized
ingredient of oleomargarine, therefore the finished product, in which
either of these ingredients was used, was not only oleomargarine, but
necessarily also was oleomargarine free from artificial coloration.
This is an obvious non sequitur. As the benefit of the lower tax
depended upon the absence from the manufactured product of artificial
coloration, it follows that if, in the manufacture, an authorized
ingredient, which was artificially colored, was used so as to
artificially color the product, whilst that product would be
oleomargarine, it could not be oleomargarine free from artificial
coloration within the intendment of the proviso. Nor is there force in
the contention that the
[195 U.S. 27, 49] plain meaning of the statute is
overcome by an amendment to which it was subjected. Before the
amendment relied on, the proviso read as follows: provided, When
oleomargarine is free from coloration or ingredient that causes it to
look like butter of any shade of yellow, said tax shall be one-fourth
of one cent per pound.' By the amendment the word ingredient was
stricken out, thus leaving the proviso in the form in which it was
enacted. The proposition is that the elimination of the word
'ingredient' compels to the conclusion that wherever artificial
coloration in the finished product of oleomargarine was produced by
artificial coloration used in an authorized ingredient, that such
coloration was not artificial within the statute. But this disregards
the fact that butter, both when artificially colored and when not so
colored, was made an authorized ingredient of oleomargarine. If, then,
the word 'ingredient' had not been stricken out, it might have given
rise to the contention that the imparting of a yellow color to the
finished product of oleomargarine by the use in its manufacture of
spring butter of a natural yellow color would have caused the product
oleomargarine to be artificially colored within the statute. As the
manufacturer of oleomargarine was permitted to use either butter not
artificially colored or butter so colored, the effect of striking out
the word 'ingredient' operated simply to render it certain that the
finished product, even although of a yellow color, would be within the
proviso where the color was imparted by an authorized ingredient not
artificially colored. This overthrows the contention that the finished
product, when not free from artificial coloration, must be treated as
free from such coloration, because the color was derived from an
artificially colored, though authorized, ingredient. We think, whilst
the statute recognized the right of a manufacturer to use any or all
of the authorized ingredients so as to make oleomargarine, and also
authorized, as one of the ingredients, butter artificially colored, if
the manufacturer elected to use such ingredient last mentioned, and
thereby gave to [195 U.S.
27, 50] his manufactured product artificial coloration,
such product so colored, although being oleomargarine, was not within
the exception created by the proviso, and therefore came under the
general rule subjecting oleomargarine to the tax of 10 cents a pound.
Nor do the other provisions of the act of 1902, as it is asserted,
sustain the contention that artificially colored oleomargarine is to
be treated as free from such coloration, because such color was
imparted in its manufacture by the use of an artificially colored and
authorized ingredient. The provision principally depended upon is 2 of
the act of 1902, which provides that any person who 'sells, vends, or
furnishes oleomargarine for the use and consumption of others, except
to his own family table, without compensation, who shall add to or mix
with such oleomargarine any artificial coloration, . . . shall also be
held to be a manufacturer of oleomargarine . . .' But this section
relates only to the adding to or mixing artificial coloration with
oleomargarine after its manufacture, and therefore does not even
remotely support the proposition that where, in the process of
manufacture, oleomargarine becomes artificially colored, it must be
held not to be what it in fact is,-that is, must be treated as free
from artificial coloration, although such in fact is not the case.
Indeed, the context of the statutes, particularly the provisions as
to adulterated and renovated butter in the act of 1902, harmonize with
and thus add cogency to the construction which we have given to the
provision concerning artificial coloration.
2d. Did Congress, in passing the acts which are assailed, exert a
power not conferred by the Constitution?
That the acts in question on their face impose excise taxes which
Congress had the power to levy is so completely established as to
require only statement. Patton v. Brady,
184 U.S. 619 , 46 L. ed. 719, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Knowlton v.
Moore,
178 U.S. 41 , 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; Nicol v. Ames,
173 U.S. 509 , 43 L. ed. 786, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Re Kollock,
165 U.S. 536 , 41 L. ed. 816, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444.
[195 U.S. 27, 51]
The last case referred to (Re Kollock) involved the act of
1886, and the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, said
(p. 536, L. ed. p. 816, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 447):
'The act before us is, on its face, an act for levying taxes, and
although it may operate in so doing to prevent deception in the sale
of oleomargarine as and for butter, its primary object must be
assumed to be the raising of revenue.'
We might rest the answer to the contention as to the want of power
in Congress to enact the laws in question upon the foregoing cases.
But in view of the earnestness with which the validity of the acts are
assailed in argument, and the assertion that the necessary effect of
the amendment to the act of 1886 by the act of 1902 is to make both of
the laws in question so peculiar as to cause them to be beyond the
reach of the previous rulings of this court, we propose to review and
dispose of the propositions pressed upon us at bar as indubitably
demonstrating that the acts in question were beyond the power of
Congress to adopt.
The summary which follows embodies the propositions contained in
the assignments of error, and the substance of the elaborate argument
by which those assignments are deemed to be sustained. Not denying the
general power of Congress to impose excise taxes, and conceding that
the acts in question, on their face, purport to levy taxes of that
character, the propositions are these:
(a) That the power of internal taxation which the
Constitution confers on Congress is given to that body for the purpose
of raising revenue, and that the tax on artificially colored
oleomargarine is void because it is of such an onerous character as to
make it manifest that the purpose of Congress in levying it was not to
raise revenue, but to suppress the manufacture of the taxed article.
(b) The power to regulate the manufacture and sale of
oleomargarine being solely reserved to the several states, it follows
that the acts in question, enacted by Congress for the purpose of
suppressing the manufacture and sale of oleo-
[195 U.S. 27, 52]
margarine, when artificially colored, are void, because
usurping the reserved power of the states, and therefore exerting an
authority not delegated to Congress by the Constitution.
(c) Whilst it is true-so the argument proceeds-that
Congress, in exerting the taxing power conferred upon it, may use all
means appropriate to the exercise of such power, a tax which is fixed
at such a high rate as to suppress the production of the article taxed
is not a legitimate means to the lawful end, and is therefore beyond
the scope of the taxing power.
(d) As the tax levied by the acts which are assailed
discriminates against oleomargarine artificially colored, and in favor
of butter so colored, and creates an unwarranted and unreasonable
distinction between the oleomargarine which is artificially colored
and that which is not, and as the necessary operation and effect of
the tax is to suppress the manufacture of artificially colored
oleomargarine, and to aid the butter industry, therefore the acts are
void. And with this proposition in mind it is insisted that wherever
the judiciary is called upon to determine whether a power which
Congress has exerted is within the authority conferred by the
Constitution, the duty is to test the validity of the act, not merely
by its face, or, to use the words of the argument, 'by the label
placed upon it by Congress,' but by the necessary scope and effect of
the assailed enactment.
(e) Admitting that the power to tax, as delegated to
Congress by the Constitution as originally adopted, was subject to no
limitation except as expressed in that instrument, the amendments to
the Constitution, it is urged, have imposed limitations on the taxing
power not expressed in the original Constitution. Under this
assumption it is insisted that the acts in question are void, because
the burdens which they impose are repugnant to both the 5th and 10th
Amendments. To the 5th Amendment, because the amount of the tax is so
out of proportion to the value of the property taxed as to destroy
that property, and thus amount to a taking
[195 U.S. 27, 53]
thereof without due process of law. To the 10th Amendment,
because the necessary operation and effect of the acts is to destroy
the oleomargarine industry, and thus exert a power not delegated to
Congress, but reserved to the several states.
(f) Although, as a general rule, it be ture that the power
of Congress to tax, conferred by the Constitution, is unlimited,
except as otherwise expressed in that instrument, and conceding, for
the sake of the argument, that there is no express limitation either
in the original Constitution or in the amendments thereto, by which
the acts may be decided to be unconstitutional, nevertheless, it is
urged that, as the burdens which the acts impose are so onerous and so
unjust as to be confiscatory, the acts are void, because they amount
to a violation of those fundamental rights which it is the duty of
every free government to protect.
It is clear that these propositions in many respects not only
reiterate in different forms of expression the same contention, but
that they also so intermingle considerations which require separate
analysis as to cause it to be difficult to precisely determine their
import. For instance, all of the propositions obviously rest not only
on inferences drawn from the face of the acts, but also on deductions
made from what it is assumed must have been the motives or purposes of
Congress in passing them. To avoid confusion and repetition we shall
consider these distinct contentions separately, and we hence come,
first, to ascertain how far, if at all, the motives or purposes of
Congress are open to judicial inquiry in considering the power of that
body to enact the laws in question. Having determined the question of
our right to consider motive or purpose, we shall then approach the
propositions relied on by the light of the correct rule on the subject
of purpose or motive.
Whilst, as a result of our written constitution, it is axiomatic
that the judicial department of the government is charged with the
solemn duty of enforcing the Constitution,
[195 U.S. 27, 54]
and therefore, in cases properly presented, of determining
whether a given manifestation of authority has exceeded the power
conferred by that instrument, no instance is afforded from the
foundation of the government where an act which was within a power
conferred, was declared to be repugnant to the Constitution, because
it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular exertion of
constitutional power was either unwise or unjust. To announce such a
principle would amount to declaring that, in our constitutional
system, the judiciary was not only charged with the duty of upholding
the Constitution, but also with the responsibility of correcting every
possible abuse arising from the exercise by the other departments of
their conceded authority. So to hold would be to overthrow the entire
distinction between the legislative, judicial, and executive
departments of the government, upon which our system is founded, and
would be a mere act of judicial usurpation.
It is, however, argued, if a lawful power may be exerted for an
unlawful purpose, and thus, by abusing the power, it may be made to
accomplish a result not intended by the Constitution, all limitations
of power must disappear, and the grave function lodged in the
judiciary, to confine all the departments within the authority
conferred by the Constitution, will be of no avail. This, when reduced
to its last analysis, comes to this: that, because a particular
department of the government may exert its lawful powers with the
object or motive of reaching an end not justified, therefore it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to restrain the exercise of a lawful
power wherever it seems to the judicial mind that such lawful power
has been abused. But this reduces itself to ths contention that, under
our constitutional system, the abuse by one department of the
government of its lawful powers is to be corrected by the abuse of its
powers by another department.
The proposition, if sustained, would destroy all distinction
between the powers of the respective departments of the gov-
[195 U.S. 27, 55]
ernment, would put an end to that confidence and respect for
each other which it was the purpose of the Constitution to uphold, and
would thus be full of danger to the permanence of our institutions. As
aptly said by the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, in
Kilborn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 190 , 26 S. L. ed. 377, 386:
'It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American
system of written constitutional law, that all the powers intrusted
to governments, whether state or national, are divided into the
three grand departments,-the executive, the legislative, and the
judicial. That the functions appropriate to each of these branches
of government shall be vested in a separate body of public servants,
and that the perfection of the system requires that the lines which
separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly
defined. It is also essential to the successful working of this
system that the persons intrusted with power in any one of these
branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided
to the others, but that each shall, by the law of its creation, be
limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own
department, and no other.'
It is, of course, true, as suggested, that if there be no authority
in the judiciary to restrain a lawful exercise of power by another
department of the government, where a wrong motive or purpose has
impelled to the exertion of the power, that abuses of a power
confended may be temporarily effectual. The remedy for this, however,
lies, not in the abuse by the judicial authority of its functions, but
in the people, upon whom, after all, under our institutions, reliance
must be placed for the correction of abuses committed in the exercise
of a lawful power. This was aptly pointed out in Champion v. Ames,
186 U.S. 321 , 47 L. ed. 492, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321, where,
speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, it was said ( p. 363, L. ed. p.
504, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 329):
'But if what Congress does is within the limits of its power, and
is simply unwise or injurious, the remedy is that suggested by Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden [9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23], when
[195 U.S. 27, 56]
he said: 'The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which
they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all
representative governments."
The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support
whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the
exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or
motive has caused the power to be exerted. As we have previously said:
from the beginning no case can be found announcing such a doctrine,
and, on the contrary, the doctrine of a number of cases is
inconsistent with its existence. As quite recently pointed out by this
court in Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41, 60 , 44 S. L. ed. 969, 977, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, the
often quoted statement of Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v.
Maryland [ 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579], that the power to tax is the
power to destroy, affords no support whatever to the proposition that
where there is a lawful power to impose a tax its imposition may be
treated as without the power because of the destructive effect of the
exertion of the authority. And this view was clearly pointed out by
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the passage from Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23, which was repeated in the passage from the
opinion in Champion v. Ames, previously cited.
And the same doctrine has been again and again expounded. In the
License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 463, 18 L. ed. 497, referring to the
extensive power of taxation possessed by Congress, and the express
limitations found in the Constitution, it was said (p. 471, L. ed. p.
500):
'It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive
power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception, and
only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must
impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes
by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches
every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.'
[195 U.S. 27, 57]
In Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433, 19 L. ed. 95,
referring to the unlimited nature of the power of taxation conferred
upon Congress, it was observed (p. 443, L. ed. p. 98):
'Congress may prescribe the basis, fix the rates, and require
payment as it may deem proper. Within the limits of the Constitution
it is supreme in its action. No power of supervision or control is
lodged in either of the other departments of the government.'
And after referring to the express limitations as to uniformity and
articles exported from any state, it was remarked (p. 446, L. ed. p.
98):
'With these exceptions, the exercise of the power is, in all
respects, unfettered.'
In Austin v. Boston, 7 Wall. 694, 19 L. ed. 224, it was again
declared (p. 699, L. ed. p. 226) 'that the right of taxation, where it
exists, is necessarily unlimited in its nature. It carries with it
inherently the power to embarrass and destroy.'
Yet again, in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482,
where a tax levied by Congress on the circulating notes of state banks
was assailed on the ground that the tax was intended to destroy the
circulation of such notes, and was, besides, the exercise of a power
to tax a subject not conferred upon Congress, it was said, as to the
first contention (p. 548, L. ed. p. 487):
'It is insisted, however, that the tax in the case before us is
excessive, and so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of
Congress to destroy the franchise of the bank, and is, therefore,
beyond the constitutional power of Congress.
'The first answer to this is that the judicial cannot prescribe
to the legislative department of the government limitations upon the
exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be
exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the
legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its
members are elected. So, if a particular tax bears heavily upon a
corporation, or a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason
only, be pronounced contrary to the Constitution.'
[195 U.S. 27, 58]
True it is, as argued, that the opinion in that case rested
the conclusion not alone upon the doctrine just quoted, but also
upon the principle that Congress possessed the power to suppress the
circulation of the notes of state banks as an incident to the
authority concerning the currency delegated to Congress by the
Constitution. But whilst this argument may weaken the authoritative
force of the statement made in the case in question as to the want
of power in the judiciary to examine into motive, it does not affect
the persuasive and inherent force of the reasoning by which that
view was sustained. Besides, the doctrine has since been affirmed.
In Spencer v. Merchant,
125 U.S. 355 , 31 L. ed. 767, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 926, speaking
through Mr. Justice Gray, it was said:
'In the words of Chief Justice Chase, condensing what had been
said long before by Chief Justice Marshall, 'The judicial department
cannot prescribe to the legislative department limitations upon the
exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be
exercised oppressively upon persons; but the responsibility of the
legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its
members are elected."
In Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41 , 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, the cases which
have been referred to were approvingly cited, and the doctrine which
they expressed was restated.
In Treat v. White,
181 U.S. 264 , 45 L. ed. 853, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611, referring to a
stamp duty levied by Congress, it was observed (p. 268, L. ed. p. 855,
Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 613):
'The power of Congress in this direction is unlimited. It does
not come within the province of this court to consider why
agreements to sell shall be subject to the stamp duty, and
agreements to buy not. It is enough that Congress, in this
legislation, has imposed a stamp duty upon the one, and not upon the
other.'
In Patton v. Brady,
184 U.S. 608 , 46 L. ed. 713, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, considering
another stamp duty levied by Congress, it was again said ( p. 623, L.
ed. p. 720, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 499):
'That it is no part of the function of a court to inquire into
the reasonableness of the excise, either as respects the amount, or
the property upon which it is imposed.'
[195 U.S. 27, 59]
It being thus demonstrated that the motive or purpose of
Congress in adopting the acts in question may not be inquired into,
we are brought to consider the contentions relied upon to show that
the acts assailed were beyond the power of Congress, putting
entirely out of view all considerations based upon purpose or motive
1. Undoubtedly, in determining whether a particular act is
within a granted power, its scope and effect is to be considered.
Applying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on
their face they levy an excise tax. That being their necessary scope
and operation, it follows that the acts are within the grant of power.
The argument to the contrary rests on the proposition that, although
the tax be within the power, as enforcing it will destroy or restrict
the manufacture of artificially coleored oleomargarine, therefore the
power to levy the tax did not obtain. This, however, is but to say
that the question of power depends, not upon the authority conferred
by the Constitution, but upon what may be the consequence arising from
the exercise of the lawful authority.
Since, as pointed out in all the decisions referred to, the taxing
power conferred by the Constitution knows no limits except those
expressly stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be
within the lawful power, the exertion of that power may not be
judicially restrained because of the results to arise from its
exercise. The proposition now relied upon was urged in Knowlton v.
Moore,
178 U.S. 41 , 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, and was
overruled. In that case it was insisted that, although death duties
were within the power to levy excise taxation, as the effect of their
extreme enforcement would involve the power to destroy the right to
the passage or receipt of property on the occasion of death,-a subject
within the exclusive control of the states,-therefore death duties,
when imposed by Congress, must be held to be unconstitutional. In
considering this contention, after referring to the statement of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall, in M'Culloch v. Maryland, that the power to
tax involves the power to destroy, it was observed (p. 60, L. ed. p.
977, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 755):
[195 U.S. 27, 60] 'This principle is
pertinent only when there is no power to tax a particular subject, and
has no relation to a case where such right exists. In other words, the
power to destroy, which may be the consequence of taxation, is a
reason why the right to tax should be confined to subjects which may
be lawfully embraced therein, even although it happens that in some
particular instance no great harm may be caused by the exercise of the
taxing authority as to a subject which is beyond its scope. But this
reasoning has no application to a lawful tax, for if it had there
would be an end of all taxation; that is to say, if a lawful tax can
be defeated because the power which is manifested by its imposition
may, when further exercised, be destructive, it would follow that
every lawful tax would become unlawful, and therefore no taxation
whatever could be levied.'
Of course, where a state law is assailed as repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, and on its face such act was
seemingly within the power of the state to adopt, but its necessary
effect and operation is to usurp a power granted by the Constitution
to the government of the United States, it must follow, from the
paramount nature of the Constitution of the United States, that the
act is void. In such a case the result of the test of necessary
operation and effect is to demonstrate the want of power, because of
the controlling nature of the limitations imposed by the Constitution
of the United States on the states.
And without attempting to review the numerous authorities cited in
the argument, it suffices to say that we think it is apparent that
they fall within one or the other of the categories just previously
stated.
2. The proposition that where a tax is imposed which is
within the grant of powers, and which does not conflict with any
express constitutional limitation, the courts may hold the tax to be
void because it is deemed that the tax is too high, is absolutely
disposed of by the opinions in the cases hitherto cited, and which
expressly hold, to repeat again the language
[195 U.S. 27, 61]
of one of the cases (Spencer v. Merchant) that 'The judicial
department cannot prescribe to the legislative department limitations
upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be
exercised oppressively upon persons; but the responsibility of the
legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its
members are elected.'
3. Whilst undoubtedly both the 5th and 10th Amendments
qualify, in so far as they are applicable, all the provisions of the
Constitution, nothing in those amendments operates to take away the
grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. The
contention on this subject rests upon the theory that the purpose and
motive of Congress in exercising its undoubted powers may be inquired
into by the courts, and the proposition is therefore disposed of by
what has been said on that subject.
The right of Congress to tax within its delegated power being
unrestrained, except as limited by the Constitution, it was within the
authority conferred on Congress to select the objects upon which an
excise should be laid. It therefore follows that, in exerting its
power, no want of due process of law could possibly result, because
that body chose to impose an excise on artificially colored
oleomargarine, and not upon natural butter artificially colored. The
judicial power may not usurp the functions of the legislative in order
to control that branch of the government in the performance of its
lawful duties. This was aptly pointed out in the extract heretofore
made from the opinion in Treat v. White,
181 U.S. 264 , 45 L. ed. 853, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611.
Bur it is urged that artificially colored oleomargarine and
artificially colored natural butter are in substance and in effect one
and the same thing, and from this it is deduced that to lay an excise
tax only on oleomargarine artificially colored, and not on butter so
colored, is violative of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment,
because, as there is no possible distinction between the two, the act
of Congress was a mere arbitrary imposition of an excise on the one
article, and not on the other, although essentially of the same class.
Conceding, merely for
[195 U.S. 27, 62] the sake of argument, that the due
process clause of the 5th Amendment would avoid an exertion of the
taxing power which, without any basis for classification, arbitrarily
taxed one article and excluded an article of the same class, such
concession would be wholly inapposite to the case in hand. The
distinction between natural butter artificially colored, and
oleomargarine artificially colored so as to cause it to look like
butter, has been pointed out in previous adjudications of this court.
Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio,
183 U.S. 238 , 46 L. ed. 171, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120, and
authorities there cited. Indeed, in the cases referred to, the
distinction between the two products was held to be so marked, and the
aptitude of oleomargarine when artificially colored, to deceive the
public into believing it to be butter, was decided to be so great,
that it was held no violation of the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment was occasioned by state legislation absolutely forbidding
the manufacture, within the state, of oleomargarine artificially
colored. As it has been thuse decided that the distinction between the
two products is so great as to justify the absolute prohibition of the
manufacture of oleomargarine artificially colored, there is no
foundation for the proposition that the difference between the two was
not sufficient, under the extremest view, to justify a classification
distinguishing between them.
4. Lastly we come to consider the argument that, even though
as a general rule a tax of the nature of the one in question would be
within the power of Congress, in this case the tax should be held not
to be within such power, because of its effect. This is based on the
contention that, as the tax is so large as to destroy the business of
manufacturing oleomargarine artificially colored to look like butter,
it thus deprives the manufacturers of that article of their freedom to
engage in a lawful pursuit, and hence, irrespective of the
distribution of powers made by the Constitution, the taxing laws are
void, because they violate those fundamental rights which it is the
duty of every free government to safeguard, and which, therefore,
should be held to be embraced by im-
[195 U.S. 27, 63] plied, though none the
less potential, guaranties, or, in any event, to be within the
protection of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment.
Let us concede, for the sake of argument only, the premise of fact
upon which the proposition is based. Moreover, concede, for the sake
of argument only, that even although a particular exertion of power by
Congress was not restrained by any express limitation of the
Constitution, if, by the perverted exercise of such power, so great an
abuse was manifested as to destroy fundamental rights which no free
government could consistently violate, that it would be the duty of
the judiciary to hold such acts to be void upon the assumption that
the Constitution, by necessary implication, forbade them.
Such concession, however, is not controlling in this case. This
follows when the nature of oleomargarine, artificially colored to look
like butter, is recalled. As we have said, it has been conclusively
settled by this court that the tendency of that article to deceive the
public into buying it for butter is such that the states may, in the
exertion of their police powers, without violating the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment, absolutely prohibit the manufacture of
the article. It hence results, that even although it be true that the
effect of the tax in question is to repress the manufacture of
artificially colored oleomargarine, it cannot be said that such
repression destroys rights which no free government could destroy,
and, therefore, no ground exists to sustain the proposition that the
judiciary may invoke an implied prohibition, upon the theory that to
do so is essential to save such rights from destruction. And the same
considerations dispose of the contention based upon the due process
clause of the 5th Amendment. That provision, as we have previously
said, does not withdraw or expressly limit the grant of power to tax
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. From this it follows, as
we have also previously declared, that the judiciary is without
authority to avoid an act of Congress exerting the taxing power, even
in a case where, to the judicial mind,
[195 U.S. 27, 64] it seems that Congress
had, in putting such power in motion, abused its lawful authority by
levying a tax which was unwise or oppressive, or the result of the
enforcement of which might be to indirectly affect subjects not within
the powers delegated to Congress.
Let us concede that if a case was presented where the abuse of the
taxing power was so extreme as to be beyond the principles which we
have previously stated, and where it was plain to the judicial mind
that the power had been called into play, not for revenue, but solely
for the purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully
destroyed consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon
which the Constitution rests, that it would be the duty of the courts
to say that such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of a
delegated power, but was the exercise of an authority not conferred.
This concession, however, like the one previously made, must be
without influence upon the decision of this cause for the reasons
previously stated; that is, that the manufacture of artificially
colored oleomargarine may be prohibited by a free government without a
violation of fundamental rights.
AFFIRMED.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice Brown, and Mr. Justice Peckham
dissent.
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